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against the Reagans and the Rule 54(b) determination regarding the appeal of that 
decision was filed August 6, 2001. The Reagans filed their Notice of Appeal on August 
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Appeals, as authorized by §78-2-2(4), U.C.A. (R. 227.) 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was the Trial Court's correct in granting summary judgment for Cendant finding 
that the Reagans had illegally subdivided the property they sold to Cendant? This Court 
"reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness. Summary 
judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, e.g., 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 P.3d 686. In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [this Court] give[s] the [Trial Court's] legal 
decisions no deference, reviewing for correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp., 2001 UT 55, 28 
P.3d 686. Specifically, a district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a 
question of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness. State ex rel. Div. of Forestry, 
Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680." 
2. Was the Trial Court correct in granting summary judgment finding that the 
Reagans illegal subdivision of the property sold to Cendant created a substantial 
encumbrance upon the property which violated the covenants of the Warranty Deed? Id. -
review for correctness. 
3. Was the Trial Court correct in granting summary judgment finding that rescission 
was the proper remedy for a real estate sale where there was a material breach of the 
covenants of the Warranty Deed? Id. - review for correctness. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following provisions were effective at the time of the sale of the Home from 
the Reagans to Cendant and are determinative of this appeal. 
§17-27-103(n(w)U.CA.: 
(i) "Subdivision" means any land that is divided [ ] into two 
or more lots, parcels, sites, units, plots, or other division of 
land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, for offer, 
sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or 
upon any and all other plans, terms, and conditions, (ii) 
"Subdivision" includes the division or development of land 
whether by deed, metes and bounds description, devise and 
testacy, lease, map, plat, or other recorded instrument. 
§17-27-804, U.C.A.: 
(1) Unless exempt under §17-27-806 or not included in the 
definition of a subdivision under Subsection 17-27-103(1), 
whenever any lands are divided, the owner of those lands 
shall have an accurate plat made of them . . . . 
§16.04.030, Wasatch County Code: 
Sale, Advertisement, or Offering for Sale of Lots in 
Unapproved Subdivisions Prohibited. Lot(s) in a 
subdivision1 that has not received final approval according to 
the requirements contained in this Title may not be advertised 
for sale, or offered for sale in any manner. 
§57-1-12, U.C.A.: 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have 
the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his 
heirs and assigns, ... with covenants from the grantor, ... that 
he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good right to 
convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and 
1
 The definition of "subdivision" in the Wasatch County Code tracks, as it must, the 
definition in the State Code. §16.04.010, W.C.C. 
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assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are 
free from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs, 
and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend 
the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs, and assigns against 
all lawful claims whatsoever. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a civil action. The case 
involves an illegal subdivision of property by the Reagans, one parcel of which was then 
sold to Cendant, and the subsequent rescission of the sale upon discovery of the 
encumbrance. 
B. Course of proceedings and disposition below. 
Cendant was initially sued by the Zitos, the purchasers from Cendant of the 
property that Cendant had acquired from the Reagans. (R. 1.) Cendant then immediately 
filed a third-party complaint against the Reagans. (R. 27 - 26.) Cendant settled with the 
Zitos. (R. 35 - 37.) 
After conducting discovery Cendant moved for summary judgment against the 
Reagans. (R. 54-53.) After hearing oral argument, the Trial Court entered an Order 
granting the Cendant5s motion for summary against the Reagans on August 6, 2001. (R. 
201-199.) 
The Trial Court determined that the division of the property into three parcels by 
the Reagans and the sale of one of these parcels to Cendant constituted an illegal 
subdivision which violated the covenants of the Warranty Deed to Cendant. (R. 200.) 
The Trial Court found that the proper remedy for such a void contract is rescission. (R. 
199.) Because the Reagans had claimed that the property had been damaged during 
Cendant5 s ownership and that the Reagans could not therefore before restored to the 
status quo ante, the Trial Court reserved a decision on the issue of damages. (R. 200-
199.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The Reagans owned approximately 80 acres of property in Wasatch County. (R. 
80.) In June of 1997, the Reagans split up the property into three pieces by conveying 
two ten-acre parcels to themselves and retaining the remaining 60 acres. (R. 79.) All that 
Mr. Reagan did in order to split up the property was to have deeds prepared and recorded 
with the County. (R. 79.) The Reagans thus failed to comply with §17-27-804, U.C.A., 
in making these divisions of their property by failing to obtain approval for and record a 
plat of the subdivision. 
According to Mr. Reagan, one of the purposes for splitting up the property was to 
lower the financing costs on his mortgage2. (R. 164.) However, Mr. Reagan also 
testified that another purpose was to "have the advantage of adding another home if I ever 
needed to." (R. 161.) 
2
 Mr. Reagan testified that he called the Wasatch County Recorder and obtained the 
incorrect advice that all he had to do to split up the property was file some deeds. (R. 
162.) The Trial Court found that "[t]he Reagans are not excused from the subdivision 
laws by their claimed reliance on the verbal instructions of a functionary employee of 
Wasatch County." (R. 200.) 
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The Reagans conveyed by a Warranty Deed to Cendant, as part of a relocation of 
Mr. Reagan's employment, one of the ten-acre parcels including their home (the 
"Home"). (R. 79.) This sale by the Reagans of the Home violated §16.04.030 W.C.C., 
which requires a County-approved subdivision before a portion of an entire property can 
be sold. 
After purchasing the Home from the Reagans as part of an employment relocation 
agreement, Cendant sold the Home to the Zitos. (R. 79.) Upon discovering that the 
Home had not been legally subdivided by the Reagans, the Zitos sued Cendant. (R. 26 -
27.) Cendant settled the suit with the Zitos for $25,000.00.3 (R. 35 - 37.) 
The Trial Court's grant of summary judgment for Cendant found that the Reagans 
had illegally subdivided their property and that the sale of the Home to Cendant therefore 
violated the covenants in the Warranty Deed. The Trial Court concluded that rescission 
was the appropriate remedy for a void contract. (R. 198 - 201.) The Trial Court reserved 
the matter of the amount of money to repaid to Cendant by the Reagans because of the 
Reagans' claims that the Home had been damaged while it was owned by Cendant. (R. 
198-201.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is the appropriate resolution of this dispute as there are no 
disputed facts. The Trial Court correctly applied §17-27-103, U.C.A. finding that the 
3
 The Reagans claim in their Brief that they have no knowledge of Cendant's settlement 
with the Zitos and this somehow affects this case. This is simply untrue. Cendant 
actions of the Reagans in splitting up their property into three pieces without obtaining 
the required subdivision approvals was illegal. Mr. Reagan's claim that the only reason 
he divided his property into three pieces was to lower the interest rate on his mortgage is 
belied by the obvious fact that if that were the only reason the parcel would have been 
divided into two pieces, not three. Moreover, in his deposition, Mr. Reagan admitted a 
future intent to develop one of the remaining two parcels of land. 
If § 17-27-103, U.C.A., were interpreted any differently than it was by the Trial 
Court, landowners could just conjure up any specious reason other than future 
development for dividing their property and escape governmental oversight. The 
Reagans desired interpretation of the code would leave a hole big enough for a truck to 
drive through, making it impossible for local to regulate the subdivision of property. It 
would, perversely, create an incentive for landowners to lie instead of comply with the 
law. Certainly that is not a result the Legislature or local governments envisioned or 
intended when creating their subdivision regulations. 
The Reagans' illegal subdivision of their property made the subsequent sale of the 
Home to Cendant a violation of the covenants statutorily contained in the Warranty Deed. 
It seems impossible to dispute the logical proposition that since the Reagans' sale to 
Cendant was illegal then the Reagans did not have the "good right to convey the same" as 
required by §57-1-12, U.C.A. 
responded to all discovery requests from the Reagans including turning over all 
information about this settlement, moreover the Settlement Agreement is in the Record. 
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Finally, the Trial Court correctly determined that rescission was the appropriate 
remedy as the covenants in the Warranty Deed had been breached and the purchase and 
sale was thus void. The case law in Utah and across the country is clear on this point and 
it is telling of the weakness of their case that the Reagans failed to even cite in their Brief 
the opinion of this Court in Anderson v. Doms, 984 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1999) almost 
directly on point. The Reagans5 only argument against rescission, that they cannot be 
restored status quo ante because of damages claimed to have been incurred to the Home 
during Cendant's ownership, was correctly remedied by the Trial Court's reservation of 
that issue for future proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY 
VIOLATED THE SUBDIVISION LAWS OF 
BOTH THE STATE AND WASATCH 
COUNTY 
The Reagans have admitted that they did not comply with the subdivision 
requirements of State and County law either when they divided their property into three 
pieces or when they sold the Home on one of the parcels to Cendant. Their only defense 
is to claim that they didn't "subdivide" their property. 
The Reagans would have this Court believe that the only reason they divided their 
property was for a lower interest rate on their mortgage. If that were the case they would 
have divided the property into two pieces rather than three. Even if was true that no 
"subdivision" occurred when the Reagans owned all three parcels they created from their 
original parcel, it was no longer true when they sold their Home to Cendant without 
bothering to obtain approval of and record a subdivision plat. What did the Reagans 
intend to do with their remaining 70 acres? Own it forever as sagebrush? 
More importantly, the Reagans5 argument that they did not intend to resell or 
develop the property when they split it up, and therefore were not required to properly 
subdivide the property is, quite literally, belied by Mr. Reagans' own words. He testified 
that he "wanted to be able to have the advantage of adding another home if [he] ever 
needed to." (R. at 161.) 
In their Brief the Reagans argue that since Mr. Reagan referred to the lower 
interest rate on his mortgage a dozen times as his motivation for subdividing the property 
and his future intent only once then this Court should do simple math and eliminate the 
future intent statement altogether, leaving eleven references to the lower interest rate and 
none about his future intent. Obviously, this is not how a party properly deals with a fatal 
admission against interest. The result the Reagans argue for is irrational, and that is why 
no case law or statutes are cited to support their argument. 
Likewise Reagan would have the Court believe that since his "primary" purpose in 
dividing his land was not development that the law does not apply to him. This sophistry 
about "primary" purpose is exactly the type of behavior the extremely broadly written 
statute was designed to prevent. The language "immediate or future" was included in 
§17-27-103, U.C.A., by the Legislature because the Legislature clearly wanted local 
governments to be able to control the hypothecation of property within their jurisdictions. 
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The Reagans would have this Court believe that §17-27-103, U.C.A., includes a 
"primacy of intention" requirement for the division of property. This type of "primacy" 
requirement would encourage people to lie about their reason for dividing their property. 
Every time someone decided to subdivide their property without following State and local 
laws, and then later sold or developed the property, a judge would have to listen to all the 
reasons, both those arguably real and those certainly fictitious, why the primary intent 
was not to develop or sell the property. This is an absurd result. The Legislature should 
not be presumed by this Court to have written a statute that opened the doors and 
protections of the judiciary to liars. 
The Reagans attempt to weasel out of their obvious intentions by claiming that 
their "primary" purpose was innocent would create an exception to the subdivision laws 
that would swallow their purpose. Anyone could divide their property claiming 
exemption for some innocent "primary" purpose and later sell the divided property to an 
innocent, or not so innocent, third-party who could then develop it with impunity. If the 
Legislature had intended that a "primacy" requirement apply to the statute, it could have 
added the word "only" or "primary" before the language "for the purpose of." Since the 
Legislature did not include this language, the plain meaning of the statute is that Reagan 
should have availed themselves of the legal mechanisms of the County before subdividing 
their land. Simply put, the reading of the statute the Reagans want this Court to adopt 
would completely change the structure of zoning and development code at the state level 
as well as for every local government in Utah. 
Reagan relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Associated General Contractors 
v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 38 P.2d 291 (Utah 2001) to support their claim that the 
statute was misinterpreted by the Trial Court.4 Reagan would have the Court believe that 
the only part of the statute that should be read is "for the purpose of. . . development." 
This reliance is misplaced. 
Obviously, the statute must be read as a whole, and when it is the meaning is clear. 
As in Associated General Contractors, the statutes here are not defined from "extraneous 
contexts," but, instead, from "the plain language of the [statutes]." Id. at 300. When read 
as a whole it is obvious that the Legislature intended that landowners seek local 
government approval before willy-nilly subdividing their land. 
In order to bolster the argument that the Trial Court did not apply the statute as 
written, the Reagans engage in yet another strange diatribe regarding percentages.5 Once 
again they cites no law to support this "mistake" the Trial Court made. The Reagans 
states that the Trial Court did not decide what percentage of the motive Reagan had to 
develop the property. This misses the point of the statute entirely. It does not matter if 
0.001% of the motivation was to sell or lease or develop the property today or at some 
point in the future. The fact of the matter is that the Legislature intended people to divide 
their property legally, which is the purpose of the statute. 
4
 Reagan also relies on the case State v. Lusk, 37 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2001) to argue that 
Cendant is somehow adding to the statute. The Reagans read Lusk exactly backwards. 
The statutes in this case, as in Lusk, could not be clearer. Cendant has not looked to 
"legislative history or policy considerations" to support an interpretation of the statutes 
involved. Instead Cendant relies on the "plain language" of the statutes. 
n 
POINT II 
THE ILLEGAL SUBDIVISION IS A 
SUBSTANTIAL ENCUMBRANCE UPON 
THE PROPERTY WHICH BREACHES 
THE COVENANTS OF THE WARRANTY 
DEED 
Both §17-27-804, U.C.A, and §16.04.030, W.C.C, make it illegal to sell and 
convey an illegally subdivided parcel of property. Thus the Reagans had no legal right to 
convey the illegally subdivided Home to themselves and then to Cendant. 
Although this is a case of first impression in Utah, courts of other state have 
consistently found that nonconformance with applicable zoning laws constitutes an 
impermissible encumbrance upon the property in violation of a warranty deed. In a case 
where plaintiffs purchased a home that did not have a certificate of occupancy because of 
an incorrectly installed septic system, the Vermont Supreme Court held that "an 
encumbrance is present when seller can determine from municipal records that the 
property violates local zoning regulations." Bianchi v. Lorenz, 701 A.2d 1037, 1039 (Vt. 
1997). 
In so finding, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized "that the majority rule in 
other jurisdictions in the country is that a violation of zoning regulations existing at the 
time of the conveyance is an encumbrance, at least where the violation has a substantial 
impact on the use and enjoyment of the land." Id. Citing Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 
410 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (numerous jurisdictions have held that an existing violation of 
5
 See p. 15 of the Reagans5 Brief. 
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a zoning law constitutes an encumbrance); FFG, Inc. v. Jones, 708 P.2d 8365 846 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 1985) (majority of jurisdictions that have decided question hold that zoning code 
violation is encumbrance within meaning of covenant against encumbrances); Seymour v. 
Evans, 608 So. 2d 1141, 1146 (Miss. 1992) (majority of jurisdictions regard existing 
violation of zoning regulations as breach of covenant against encumbrances).6 
In this case, the illegality of the subdivision, in violation of zoning laws is a 
substantial encumbrance upon the property resulting in a breach of the covenant against 
encumbrances contained in the Warranty Deed. One of the covenants in a warranty deed 
is that the deeded property will be free from encumbrances and that the transferor has the 
"good right to convey the same". §57-1-12, U.C.A. If the sale to Cendant was illegal 
under both State and County law then how the Reagans can claim that they didn't breach 
this covenant is a mystery that the Reagans have yet to explain. 
The Reagans reliance on Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (1962) for the proposition that 
Utah has held that a violation of zoning laws does not equal an encumbrance on property 
is misplaced. Reagan would have the Court believe that a violation of the subdivision 
ordinances and statutes do not give rise to a private action, but, instead, only creates a 
duty running to the sovereign. But, the statute involved in Ellis was a criminal statute 
making it a misdemeanor to sell an unrecorded subdivision lot. Therefore, it is logical 
6
 In Seymour v Evans, 608 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1992) the Mississippi Supreme Court held 
that for a zoning violation to create an encumbrance that violated the warranty deed the 
"violation had to exist prior to the sale." That is precisely the factual situation here. (R. 
173.) The Reagans had deeded the property to themselves, thus creating the violation, 
and then sold it to the innocent third party, Cendant, thereby breaching the covenants of 
13 
that the Court, when referencing a statute with criminal penalties, would specify that any 
duty under the statute would run to the sovereign, as the sovereign would be the one to 
prosecute under the statute. 
Ellis did not address, as even the Reagans acknowledge, whether the illegal 
subdivision violated any of the warranties of title because that issue was not raised in the 
Complaint. In the case at bar this issue was indisputably raised by Cendant and decided 
by the Trial Court. 
While attempting to rely on Ellis as the law in Utah, the Reagans admit that the 
majority of courts across the country (as seen above in Bianchi, Feit, FFG and Seymour) 
regard a violation of a zoning restriction as a breach of the covenant against 
encumbrances. The Reagans argue that those rulings are inconsistent with Utah authority 
supposedly requiring that an encumbrance must involve a third party holding a right in the 
land constituting a burden or limitation. Even following that analysis, in this case the 
County is a third party and the limitation the County imposes on selling a property that is 
illegally subdivided constitutes an almost insurmountable burden on the future use and 
resale of the property. That the third party holding the encumbrance is a governmental 
entity instead of a private person is neither unusual nor violative of the logic of the 
impermissibility of the encumbrance. 
the warranty deed. 
7
 "In fact, the complaint does not rely on any of the five warranties embraced in the 
statutory warranty deed." Ellis at 386. 
While the Reagans claim to find succor for this argument in Brewer v. Peatross, 
595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1979) the Reagans must have missed the portion of the Brewer 
opinion where the encumbrance on the property held to be improper was the existence of 
a special improvement district imposed by the City of Roosevelt. Id. at 867. The factual 
situation here is therefore directly analogous to Brewer. 
The law across the country is logical and consistent. The provisions of §57-1-12, 
U.C.A., are the same. The illegal subdivision of a piece of property creates an 
encumbrance that breaches a warranty deed's covenants against encumbrances and in 
favor of transferability. This Court should follow the other courts across the country and 
rule that an illegal subdivision of land is a breach of the covenants of a warranty deed. 
POINT III 
RESCISSION OF THE SALE OF THE 
PROPERTY IS THE PROPER REMEDY 
In the recent case of Anderson v. Dorns, 984 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1999), this Court 
found that rescission was the appropriate remedy for a breach of the covenant against 
encumbrances even where the legal dispute had lingered for years before the buyer 
realized he could attempt to rescind the contract. Frankly, that should be the end of this 
argument and it is astonishing that the Reagans did not even bother to address the 
controlling case on the subject in their Brief. 
Moreover, "[Rescission] is consistent with Utah case law and that of other 
jurisdictions." Id. at 398. In Anderson the Court directed that "the Trial Court should 
15 
determine what is necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties 
entered into the contract." Id. The Trial Court can easily accomplish that after the 
resolution of this appeal. The Reagans get their property back and Cendant's get their 
money back, while leaving the option of an adjustment to Cendant's recovery as damages 
for the Reagans alleged property deterioration. How much closer to status quo ante can 
you get? 
Instead of addressing the controlling case, Anderson, the Reagans rely on a 
misreading of 50 West Broadway Associates v. The Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989). In addition to the fact that 50 West Broadway was 
decided before Anderson, that case is distinguishable from the case at bar for at least three 
reasons. First, this is not a case about contract construction between a savvy commercial 
developer and a government entity, it is a simple residential real estate transaction. 
Second, Cendant rescinded the contract as soon as the facts about the illegal subdivision 
came to light. In contrast to 50 West Broadway where the attempt to rescind the contract 
only occurred after years of knowing about and ignoring the option Cendant "pursue[d] 
its claim with timely diligence." Id. at 1170. Third, unlike in 50 West Broadway a 
building has not been placed over any of the Reagans property, a situation which would 
make status quo ante restoration more difficult. 
Utah courts have said time and time again that rescission is the appropriate 
remedy, even when the dispute has continued for years, and even when there is an 
8
 Similarly, because Cendant promptly sought rescission against the Reagans this case is 
1£ 
argument about damages. What is important in the case at bar is that the Reagans 
illegally subdivided their property. Upon discovery of the encumbrance created by the 
illegal sale Cendant promptly sought to rescind the contract and attempted to return the 
property to the Reagans. 
The remedy of rescission in the case at bar would require placing the parties in the 
same position they were before the sale. This would be a refund to Cendant of the 
purchase price, plus interest and other damages, plus the monies Cendant was required to 
pay the Zito's, less any possible deterioration of the property directly attributable to 
Cendant. 
[T]he rule that he who desires to rescind a contract must restore whatever 
he has received under it is one of justice and equity, not of procedure - of 
substance, not of form - and must be reasonably construed and applied. The 
object of the rule is theoretically to place the parties in status quo; but the 
rule is equitable, not technical, and does not require more than that such 
restoration be made as is reasonably possible and such as the merits of the 
case demand. All that is generally necessary is that one party be placed in 
substantially his original situation and that the other derive no 
unconscionable advantage from his conduct. 
17A Am.Jur. 2d., Contracts §592 at 602. (Emphasis added.) 
If the Reagans have a claim that the Home has been damaged the burden of proof 
on that issue shifts to them. Logically, their claim of damages to the Home can't logically 
be more that the value of the Home and therefore any such damages could simply be 
deducted from the purchase price that the Reagans would be required to return to 
Cendant. 
not controlled by Coalville City v. Lungren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah App. 1997). 
17 
CONCLUSION 
The Reagans illegally subdivided their property and then illegally sold one of the 
parcels to Cendant. This illegal subdivision created a substantial encumbrance upon the 
property resulting in breaches of the covenants against encumbrances and in favor of 
transferability statutorily contained in the Warranty Deed. The sale was thus void. 
Rescission is the suitable remedy in this case. 
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 2002. 
Baird & Jones L.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellee Cendant Mobility 
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